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THE RATIONAL WEAKNESS OF STRONG TIES:
Failure of Group Solidarity in a Highly Cohesive
Group of Rational Agents
Andreas Flache
Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and
Methodology—ICS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Recent research (Flache, 1996; Flache and Macy, 1996) suggests a ‘‘weakness of
strong ties.’’ Cohesive social networks may undermine group solidarity, rather
than sustain it. In the original analysis, simulations showed that adaptive
actors learn cooperation in bilateral exchanges faster than cooperation in more
complex group exchanges, favoring ties at the expense of the common good. This
article uses game theory to demonstrate that cognitive simplicity is not a scope
condition for the result. The game theoretical analysis identifies a new condi-
tion for the failure of group solidarity in a cohesive group. Task uncertainty
may make rational cooperation increasingly inefficient in common good pro-
duction. Accordingly, rational actors may increasingly sacrifice benefits from
common good production in order to maintain social ties, as their dependence
on peer approval rises.
Keywords: Group solidarity, Social dilemmas, Social control, Agency theory,
Game theory, Imperfect information, Computer simulation
INTRODUCTION
It is almost a truism for theories of solidarity that strong social ties further
group solidarity.1 Collective action research shows that dense networks of
For their useful comments and criticism the author is indebted to Gerald Mackie, two
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Address correspondence to Andreas Flache, ICS—University of Groningen, Grote
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1Following Hechter (1987), I view group solidarity here as contribution to common goods that
benefit every member but require a joint effort to be produced (cf. Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990;
Petersen, 1992). This distinguishes group solidarity from solidarity that pertains to a relationship
between two individuals, such as fairness in sharing, help in need situations or refraining from
breaching promises (Lindenberg, 1998). It is the central topic of this analysis to address the
potential conflict between the common good and the relational arena of solidary behavior in groups.
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communication and interaction greatly facilitate group mobilization in
political uprising or strike movements (Opp and Gern, 1993, 673; Gould,
1993, 7347740; Marwell and Oliver, 1993, 104). Similarly, in the workplace
social ties are known to foster group tasks. Coleman (1994) points out that
Japanese firms often create ‘‘company towns’’ and ‘‘common recreational
facilities’’ for their employees ‘‘designed to simultaneously strengthen
loyalty to the company and social ties among employees’’ (173). Petersen
(1992) concludes in an overview of the literature that ‘‘the evidence pro-
vided by industrial sociologists is that social rewards can be quite important
in regulating behavior’’ (341).
Recent work (Flache, 1996; Flache and Macy, 1996; Kitts et al., 1999;
Flache et al., 2000) argues that the relationship between group solidarity
and strong ties is more complex than the literature has it. These studies
suggest a ‘‘weakness of strong ties.’’ Cohesive networks may often under-
mine group solidarity rather than sustain it. The argument focuses on the
desire of actors to obtain social rewards, such as affection or approval,
from other group members. This desire may compromise actors’ will-
ingness to impose social control, because enforcers may fear to loose
valued rewards from deviants. However, Flache and Macy’s argument
hinges critically on the assumption that agents possess extremely low
cognitive capacities. Their simulations showed that ‘‘backward looking’’
adaptive actors learn cooperation in bilateral social relations faster than
cooperation in more complex group exchanges, favoring emergence of
strong ties at the expense of the common good. This article generalizes the
argument. I show that cognitive simplicity is not a scope condition for the
weakness of strong ties. I use a game theoretical model in the tradition of
recent work in agency theory that combines the analytical precision of
rational choice theory with sociologists’ attention for informal incentives
(Holla¨nder, 1990; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Spagnolo, 1999; Loch, Huber-
man and Stout, 2000). The analysis highlights task uncertainty as a new
and empirically plausible condition under which even strategically rational
actors may fail to effectively organize peer pressure in highly cohesive
groups.
The article uses the potential conflict between task and ties at the
workplace to illustrate the argument, but the scope is more general. The
conflict between common interest and social relations has not only been
overlooked in studies of work group behavior (Petersen, 1992) but also in
analyses of group solidarity and collective action (Hechter, 1987; Marwell
and Oliver, 1993). Section 2 discusses the theoretical background. Subse-
quently, I present the formal model of team production and social inter-
action. Section 4 then deals with game theoretical analysis of the model and
section 5 presents results.
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TIES VS. TASK: CONFLICTING THEORETICAL VIEWS
At the workplace, the problem of group solidarity centers on the ‘‘workers’
dilemma’’ whether to ‘‘work’’ or ‘‘shirk.’’ Workers share a common interest in
maximizing productivity if, for example, weak performance by the firm leads
to the loss of jobs, or wages are tied to production norms by bonus payments
or group piece-rate schemes (Edwards and Scullion, 1982, 182). At the
same time, workers face an individual incentive to ‘‘free ride’’ by ‘‘shirking’’
while others shoulder the burden of maximizing task performance (Olson,
1965; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Homans (1974) argued that peer pres-
sure may be the central mechanism to attain group solidarity in such a social
dilemma2 (Dawes, 1980). Strong ties give members the leverage to serve as
taskmasters, praising hard workers and ostracizing shirkers. Correspond-
ingly, most researchers have assumed that this effect of social pressure on
collective action is moderated by members’ dependence on the group for
social approval (Seashore, 1954; Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950; for
an overview of empirical studies, see Lott and Lott, 1965). That is, as
member dependence on peer approval increases, social sanctions will
become more effective as catalysts of group solidarity.
Flache and Macy (1996) argued that the theory of compliant peer
pressure through strong ties is flawed. The potential collective benefit
from effective social control is no guarantee that members of a group-
rewarded production team will be willing to enforce work norms, due to
the ‘‘second-order free-rider problem’’ (Oliver, 1980). Friends with few
outside sources of social support may be reluctant to risk personal
relationships by using approval as an instrument of social control.
Computer models of the evolution of friendship networks (Flache and
Macy, 1996; Flache, 1996; Kitts, Macy, Flache, 1999) support this con-
clusion. The simulations replicated Homans’ prediction that social pres-
sure may solve social dilemmas if actors use approval to selectively
reward good behavior. However, if agents are allowed the option to offer
unconditional approval to their peers, dyads tend to form in which both
sides approve of each other while the interactants neglect investments
in the common good. As a consequence, a cohesive informal network may
arise, while at the same time the group fails to achieve group solidarity.
2Social dilemmas may also arise under work group norms that discourage high effort, such
as quota restriction norms (Homans, 1951, 79). The analysis of social control failure applies to
both norms of production and quota restriction, because in both cases high dependence on
peer approval may deter workers from imposing social pressure on deviants. To facilitate
presentation, I focus in the remainder on the dilemmas created by production norms.
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Flache (1996) confirmed this weakness of strong ties in laboratory
experiments.3
The analysis of the weakness of strong ties opens up an intriguing new
view on the relationship between social relations and group solidarity.
However, the theoretical argument suffers from a potentially severe lim-
itation of scope. Flache and Macy (1996) assumed ‘‘stochastic learning’’
(Bush-Mosteller, 1955), a rather extreme—if not empirically implausible—
representation of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). In this model, actors
make choices exclusively on basis of a simple ‘‘trial and error’’ rule, entirely
refraining from anticipation of the consequences of their actions. In addi-
tion, the model uses ‘‘satisficing’’ actors (Simon, 1955), who deem sub-
optimal outcomes as ‘‘good enough’’ rather than searching for a better
solution. Only this combination of stochastic learning with satisficing
generates the prediction of social control failure. In the computer analysis
(Flache and Macy, 1996), strong ties quickly stabilized after backward-
looking actors coordinated in a random search on the rewarding outcome of
mutual approval (relational cooperation). The coordination of this ‘‘sto-
chastic collusion’’ (Macy, 1989, 1991) in bilateral exchanges is simple as
compared with the coordination of groupwise cooperation in common good
production (task cooperation). As a consequence, strong ties of mutual
approval arise in the simulated team well before stochastic collusion in the
work task. With sufficient dependence on peer approval, satisficing actors
then deem the outcome of strong ties good enough despite failure of
common good provision.
Subsequent game theoretical analyses tested the robustness of the
argument. (Flache, 1996; Flache et al., 2000). These analyses question the
learning theoretical underpinning of the weakness of strong ties. Perfectly
rational actors are not distracted from social control by strong friendship
relations. Instead, under a large range of conditions, rational actors are
capable of solving the complicated cooperation problem posed by simul-
taneous exchanges of approval and contribution to the common good (full
cooperation). Mutual anticipation of rational behavior allows actors to
engineer reciprocity in form of conditional full cooperation in repeated
3In the laboratory game, subjects made choices to invest in ‘‘work’’ and in ‘‘approval of a
colleague.’’ ‘‘Work’’ contributed to the collective welfare (group wage), while ‘‘approval’’
constituted a contribution to the colleague’s personal welfare. The study compared two
conditions. In one condition, unconditional approval was feasible, and in the other condition
feedback was restricted so that only multilateral exchanges involving task contribution could
arise. As expected, peer pressure, measured in terms of subjects’ tendency to reward task
contribution with approval, dropped significantly when unconditional approval was allowed
(184). Accordingly, task contribution was lower and declined faster in that condition
(1697179).
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interactions (cf. Friedman, 1971, 1986; Axelrod, 1984, 1997; Voss, 1985;
Taylor, 1987; Raub, 1988). When actors are sufficiently interested in future
rewards, rational egoists refrain from shirking in the present, because they
anticipate others’ retaliation. In this perspective, strong ties enhance the
sanctioning potential that members can mobilize to deter shirkers. Pun-
ishment strategies become feasible that impose on deviants not only the
loss of future provision of the good, but also the loss of valued peer
rewards. As a consequence, the threat of stronger sanctions stabilizes
cooperation both in ties and task, consistently with traditional theories of
informal control.
Despite the robustness of conditional cooperation between rational
actors, backward-looking decision making may not be a necessary
assumption to predict a weakness of strong ties. Even strategically
rational decision makers may fail to mobilize strong ties for informal
social control, if social conditions occur that exacerbate the potential
conflict between task and ties. In particular, imperfect information about
others’ behavior may greatly compromise the effectiveness of social
control. However, previous game theoretical analyses and simulations
studies of social control (Heckathorn, 1989, 1990; Flache, 1996; Spagnolo,
1999; Flache et al., 2000) neglected this possibility and assumed perfect
information.
In common good production, individual actors may occasionally fail to
contribute to the collective task due to ‘‘idiosyncratic disturbances’’
(Bendor and Mookherjee, 1987; cf. Green and Porter, 1984; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991). Bendor and Mookherjee highlight the complication that task
uncertainty implies for task cooperation. Peer monitoring in organizations
is often imperfect. Workers may observe only the results of colleagues’
contributions to a group effort, but these results may be an unreliable
indicator of actual efforts. For example, a member of a consultancy team
works hard at home to deliver a report to an important client in due time,
but a computer failure makes it impossible for the consultant to meet the
deadline. Afterwards, colleagues can only tell that the consultant failed to
contribute. As a consequence, ‘‘erroneous’’ defections may severely curtail
efficiency of task reciprocity, because conditionally cooperative strategies
need to impose at least some retaliation in order to credibly deter free
riders (cf. Wu and Axelrod, 1995; Kollock, 1993).
The problem of imperfect information may be crucial for the conflict
between task and ties. Multilateral task exchanges tend to suffer more from
idiosyncratic disturbances as compared to bilateral social exchanges. The
error probability increases with the number of participants, and monitoring
is more effective in social relations that take place in face to face inter-
actions. Accordingly, when full cooperation links ties to task performance
in a noisy environment, the danger of unintended chains of mutual
The Rational Weakness of Strong Ties 193
sanctions may put social ties under severe pressure. This increases the
attractiveness of purely relational cooperation as an alternative solution for
the group. The game theoretical analysis of this article shows how this
problem of task-uncertainty renders the weakness of strong ties consistent
with the notion of strategic rationality.
THE REPEATED TEAM GAME
The model of team production assumes that actors value wage payments
and approval of their peers, and they rationally weight these values
against the effort required to obtain them. Wage payments are tied to
team performance i.e., the more workers contribute to the collective
effort, the higher the payment. Actors face two decisions: whether to
invest in collective effort (‘‘work’’) and whether to invest in their rela-
tionships with other members of the group (‘‘approval’’). To simplify, I
assume actors must choose between just two options for each decision: to
work or shirk, and to approve or not approve. I refer to the aggregated
amount of work contributions in the group as ‘‘task performance,’’ while
the aggregated amount of approval between group members is denoted
‘‘group cohesion.’’ Group interaction is modeled as a repeated N-person
game. Equation (1) represents the strategy of player i in iteration t of the
game as vector sit
8i : sit ¼ ðwit;ai1t; . . . ;aiNtÞ: ð1Þ
The symbols i; j in (1) index actors, w and a identify each of the two
decisions, work effort and social approval. The work decision of actor i in
iteration t is denoted wit, where wit ¼ 0 for shirkers and wit ¼ 1 for con-
tributors. i’s approval of j is indicated by aijt, where aijt ¼ 1, when i
approves of j and aijt ¼ 0, otherwise. To preclude narcissism, the restric-
tion aijt ¼ 0 is employed. Within one iteration, actors take decisions
simultaneously and independently.
Following Bendor and Mookherjee (1987), task uncertainty is modelled
with a commonly known probability e that due to some mishap an indivi-
dual’s contribution fails to be effective ð0  e  1Þ, where e is equal for all
group members. Hence, with e> 0, a worker knows after every iteration t
the group output in terms of the number of effective contributions in
previous iterations t0, but group members are not aware of the actual input
wjt0 of individual colleagues. At the same time, workers are assumed to be
fully and perfectly informed on the approval actions ajkt0 of all group
members in previous iterations t0< t. This is a rather extreme assumption,
but it greatly facilitates model analysis, while it still captures the
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substantive assumption that monitoring in social relations is more accurate
and less vulnerable to ‘‘exogenous disturbances’’ as compared to group
exchanges of task contribution. Finally, actors are perfectly informed on all
other aspects of the game.
The expected payoff of actor i in iteration t of the game, uit, results from
both expected benefits from wage and approval and the costs of i’s own
effort and social actions. Two types of benefits may offset the effort or
expense from hard work or from giving approval: a higher group wage and
social approval by one’s peers. Group wage is modelled as a linear function
of aggregated individual outputs. Aggregated output may be lower than the
number of actual effort investments due to task uncertainty. Each actor
receives 1=Nth of the bonus earned by the group, regardless of contribu-
tion, where the output of one worker increases the group bonus by one
unit. The second source of benefit is social approval from one’s peers. I
leave the complication of informal status hierarchies to future research and
assume that for ego every colleague’s contribution is equally valuable.
Finally, when ego invests into the collective effort, his utility is diminished
by work costs. In addition, a group member may incur some cost for every
unit of approval he gives to one of his peers. Equation (2) formalizes the







ð1 eÞwjt þ bajit
 




The parameter a scales the wage that workers earn per unit of output
produced. The parameter b represents the value of a unit of approval. A
high value of b models for example that workers live in a company town,
where they are highly dependent on colleagues’ approval due to lack of
alternative social contacts outside their work group. Finally, the costs of
spending a unit of effort and the costs of giving a unit of approval are
indicated by the parameters c and c0, respectively.
The analysis focuses on games with a N-Prisoner’s dilemma structure,
where cooperation in the exchange of work effort is collectively desirable,
but actors face incentives to free ride. This implies that loafing is more
cost-effective than working and that everyone realizes a Pareto optimal
collective benefit when everyone pulls his weight, or
a
N
< c < a: ð3Þ
Similarly, exchange of approval is profitable for both participants, but there
is at least some incentive to free ride on approval. Hence, the unit costs of
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approval provisions (c0) are positive and lower than the unit benefit b.
Formally,
0 < c0 < b: ð4Þ
Then, cooperation in this game is problematic. The constituent one-shot
game has a unique Nash equilibrium where all workers shirk and no
approval is given. In this equilibrium, each player maximizes his utility
given the behavior of all others.4
To model reciprocity in repeated games, I use the standard assumption
of infinite repetition of the game with exponential discounting of future
payoffs5 (cf. Friedman, 1971, 1986; Taylor, 1987). The accumulated payoff
ui of actor i in the repeated game sums discounted payoffs over all itera-




ttuit; 0 < t < 1: ð5Þ
where t is the discount parameter, i.e., the value of an actor interest in
future payoffs. For simplicity, t is assumed equal for all members of the
group. The payoff of iteration t, uit, ensues from the corresponding out-
come as defined by equation (2) above.
MODEL ANALYSIS
Solution Criteria
Broadly, a solution of the game is a prediction for players’ behavior
that satisfies certain reasonable requirements. I use three straightfor-
ward criteria to identify solutions of the repeated team game. First,
I only consider strictly symmetrical outcomes, i.e., outcomes in which
every player follows the same strategy for the repeated game. Homo-
geneity of the group in individual characteristics implies that non-
symmetrical solutions can be excluded, because there is no systematic
reason why players with equal characteristics should follow different
strategies.
4The payoff structure of this game is equivalent with the earlier game theoretical analysis
(Flache, 1996; cf. Flache, Macy, Raub 2000). With unit wage ¼ 1 the model also replicates
the condition of the feasibility of bilateral exchanges of approval in the simulation model of
Flache and Macy (1996).
5Alternatively, the game may be seen as an indefinitely repeated game such that actors
know that after every decision round there is a certain probability that the game may end. For
example, actors may at any time expect to find a new job with a certain probability.
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The second solution principle is individual rationality. In game theo-
retical terms, individual rationality implies Nash equilibrium. Given the
strategy of all other players, no member of the group can improve his
payoff by a unilateral change of his strategy. Moreover, sanction threats are
credible, i.e., it is actor’s best strategy to carry out the sanction even after
it failed to deter deviation. Technically, this implies that the solution of the
game is a subgame perfect equilibrium (spe) (Selten, 1965, cf. Kreps
1990).
The third solution requirement is efficiency in terms of payoff dom-
inance. Payoff dominance eliminates those spes from the set of possible
solutions to which all players would unanimously prefer other spes (for
more details, see Harsanyi, 1977, 1167119). Symmetry renders appli-
cation of payoff dominance particularly simple. Symmetrical strategies
generate the same expected payoff value for all players. Accordingly, the
solution of the game is the symmetrical spe for which this value is
maximal in the set of all possible symmetrical spes of the repeated
game.
Trigger Strategies
The analysis uses a generalized form of so-called trigger strategies
(Friedman, 1971, 1986), because these strategies combine three important
features. First, trigger strategies model conditional cooperation, the
mechanism that sustains reciprocity. Second, trigger strategies can provide
an endogenous explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas consistent
with the central solution requirement of individual rationality (Friedman,
1971, 1986). Finally, trigger strategies are relatively easy to analyze. In
particular, the collective efficiency of a symmetrical trigger strategy can be
computed straightforwardly, which greatly facilitates the application of
payoff dominance.
Trigger strategies under imperfect information generate cooperative
behavior in a normal period of the game, but as soon as the corre-
sponding norm has been violated too much, the trigger strategy reverts
to a sanction strategy for a subsequent sanction period. Cooperation is
restored after the sanction period, but only as long as there is sufficient
compliance. To address the tradeoff between strong ties and task per-
formance, I distinguish three types of trigger strategies corresponding to
the three forms of reciprocity norms, full cooperation, task cooperation,
and relational cooperation. Full cooperation represents the norm to both
work hard and approve of colleagues, resulting in simultaneous high task
performance and high group cohesion. Task cooperation limits coopera-
tion to the work game alone, whereas no approval is exchanged among
members. Accordingly, task cooperation induces high task performance
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while the group is not cohesive. Finally, relational cooperation demands
exclusively cooperation in the approval games, generating a highly
cohesive team with zero task performance.6
Under full co-operation, swa, actors trade both work and approval in
return for others’ work and approval. Individual rationality and collective
efficiency allow the narrowing down of the range of strategies of full
cooperation. To begin with, only strategies are of interest that punish any
failure to approve of a colleague with the severest possible sanction—
immediate full and eternal defection by all other players. Due to perfect
information in the approval games, every deviation from the norm to
approve is a perfect indication of an intended violation of the norm.
Accordingly, any weaker sanction unnecessarily limits the range of condi-
tions under which this deviation can be deterred by full cooperation. At the
same time, task uncertainty implies that a certain degree of lenience with
respect to deviations in the work game is required to optimize efficiency.
Otherwise, unintended failures to contribute may generate too many
sequences of mutual punishment. Lenience in the sanctions imposed may
mitigate the problem, but too much lenience curtails the effectiveness of
the sanction. This, in turn, invites exploitation by shirkers (cf. Kreps,
1990).
Following Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) I use two parameters of a full
cooperation trigger strategy to model the trade off between lenience and
deterrence, the cutoff level l and the sanction time s. In the strategy
swað s; lÞ, ego fully cooperates throughout a normal period, but he reverts
6A fourth trigger strategy of interest might be called ‘‘purely social control.’’ Under purely
social control, shirkers are exclusively sanctioned by the withdrawal of colleagues’ approval,
while enforcers continue to work in the sanction period. Under imperfect information, it might
be of interest to take this strategy into account, because it promises to avoid the efficiency
losses that task uncertainty entails due to mutual punishment in the work game. However, on
closer inspection it turns out that under task uncertainty, efficiency losses in the work game
are still considerable, even when control is purely social. The reason is that with a purely social
control strategy, rational workers who are sanctioned by their colleagues have no incentive to
contribute to the work game or to approve of their peers before the sanction period is over.
Sanction credibility enforces that cooperative behavior in the sanction period can not alleviate
the punishment. As a consequence, task performance under purely social control gradually
declines to a level where the number of shirkers stabilizes at a level reflecting the strength of
task uncertainty. Obviously, it greatly complicates the analysis to find the equilibrium conditions
for this kind of strategy as compared with simpler strategies where task and ties are either
disentangled (task cooperation and relational cooperation) or fully linked (full cooperation).
To assess the consequences of purely social control, I conducted explorative numerical
analyses of equilibrium conditions. These analyses indicated that the qualitative results of the
present study do not change when strategies of purely social control strategies are considered.
The corresponding equilibria are only under a small range conditions payoff superior to any of
the competing solutions of full cooperation, task cooperation, or relational cooperation.
Accordingly, I abstain in this article from a full-scale analysis of purely social control.
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to a sanction period of exactly s iterations as soon as in the normal period
the group output falls below the strategy specific cut-off level l. After the
sanction period, ego starts a new normal period with an initial round of
unconditional full cooperation. Individual rationality implies that there is no
need to consider full cooperation strategies that only withdraw task con-
tribution to impose a sanction. If a sanction is imposed, it should be as
severe as possible to maximize deterrence. However, efficiency might yield
a reason to consider sanction strategies of ‘‘purely social control’’ that
exclusively withdraw approval to sanction but continue to work. These
strategies might maintain a relatively high group output, because they
avoid costly ‘‘echo effects’’ in task sanctions. However, I do not take into
account purely social control, because exploratory numerical studies
showed that this does not change qualitative results while it greatly com-
plicates analysis of the corresponding equilibria (for more detail, cf. note 6).
Under a strategy of task cooperation sww, cooperative behavior is
restricted to the work game alone. Ego only demands that a sufficient
number of effective contributions to the group task be made in every
normal period. In return, ego works hard in the corresponding period, but
he does not invest peer approval. To optimize sanctioning policies in the
work game, strategies of task cooperation, swwðs; lÞ vary in their sanction
time s and the cut-off level l, like strategies of full cooperation.
Under relational cooperation, saa, a group member demands to be
approved of by all colleagues in exchange for his approval of the peers.
Again, perfect monitoring in approval games implies that only a strategy
maximizes the range of conditions for individual rationality that responds
with full and eternal punishment to every observed failure to approve.
Accordingly, the analysis deals only with this particular strategy of rela-
tional cooperation.
Efficiency and Individual Rationality of Trigger Strategies
Relational cooperation only involves games with perfect monitoring.
Accordingly, conditions for the individual rationality of relational coop-
eration follow from Friedman’s theorem (1971; 1986, 88789). Friedman
showed that universal play of trigger strategies such as saa constitutes
a subgame perfect equilibrium, if and only if actors are sufficiently
interested in future payoffs. For relational cooperation, this yields con-
dition (6)
t > t
 ¼ Taa  Raa
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The symbol Taa in equation (6) represents the payoff from receiving uni-
versal approval without costs of reciprocation. Raa indicates the payoff ego
derives from cooperation in the exchange of approval for approval with
every other member of the group. Finally, Paa ¼ 0 is the payoff an actor
obtains from the punishment outcome of universal full defection. The
rightmost term in equation (6) obtains when the game payoffs are sub-
stituted according to the definitions of the team game (2)7(4), i.e.,
Taa ¼ ðN  1Þb; Raa ¼ ðN  1Þðb c0Þ and Paa ¼ 0.
Condition (6) expresses the trade-off between short-term gain of uni-
lateral defection ðTaa  RaaÞ and the ensuing long-term loss of rewards
from the exchange ðTaa  PaaÞ. In relational cooperation, this simply
translates into the requirement that the discount rate exceeds the ratio of
the costs of approving to the unit value of approval. If equation (6) is
satisfied, the accumulated payoff every group member obtains from uni-
versal relational cooperation, uiðsaaÞ, is obtained according to (5). Hence
uiðsaaÞ ¼ Raa
1 t ¼
ðN  1Þðb c0Þ
1 t ð7Þ
Friedman’s theorem also yields a first necessary condition for individual
rationality of full cooperation. Full cooperation needs to deter full
defection in both work and approval games. Under full cooperation, a
deviant knows that eternal punishment is unavoidable after any failure to
approve. Hence, it is then ego’s best deviation to immediately defect to
the largest possible extent, i.e., to shirk and to shun all colleagues.
Accordingly, any full cooperation strategy swaðs; lÞ can only be a spe if
every actor’s interest in future payoffs, t, exceeds the critical level t*,
where
t > t
 ¼ T^wa R^wa
T^wa  Pwa
: ð8Þ
The symbol T^wa refers to the expected payoff from one round of unilateral
maximal deviation under full cooperation, T^wa ¼ ð1 eÞ aðN1ÞN þ ðN  1Þb.
The symbol R^wa denotes the expected payoff for a compliant player
from one round of universal full cooperation, R^wa ¼ ð1 eÞa cþ
ðN  1Þðb c0Þ. Finally, the payoff for one round of universal full deviation
is zero by definition, Pwa ¼ 0. Condition (8) is independent from the actual
sanction profile ðs; lÞ. This reflects that the condition only deals with
deterrence of deviations in the approval part of the game where monitoring
is perfect even under task uncertainty.
To guarantee individual rationality of full cooperation, swaðs; lÞ and task
cooperation, swwðs; lÞ, both strategies need to ensure additionally that
optimal unilateral deviations in the work game do not pay. To also optimize
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efficiency, the strategy profile s
; l
 is sought that for both sww and swa





subject to the constraint that the corresponding trigger strategy
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.7 Spe conditions for deviations
in the approval game follow from equations (6) and (8). For calculation of
expected payoffs of trigger strategies and for evaluation of the constraint
that work deviations do not pay, I adapted an efficient numerical algorithm
from Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) that solves the optimization problem
for a given set of conditions ða; b; c; c0;N ; e; tÞ. The algorithm needs to test
only one condition per cutoff l and per class of strategy sww or swa to
ensure individual rationality for every possible strategy with the corre-
sponding cut-off level. This is the condition that the trigger strategy with
eternal punishment and cut-off level l is individually rational. Intuitively,
the reason is that eternal punishment maximizes the expected loss from
the sanction that a deviant faces. If and only if this loss is sufficient to deter
unilateral defection, there will be some finite sanction period s that guar-
antees a subgame perfect equilibrium for the given strategy with cut-off
level l. Technically, adaptation of Bendor and Mookherjee’s result yields
theorem 1. The theorem applies to both full cooperation and task coop-
eration. Accordingly, subindices wa and ww are dropped in the notation.
Theorem 1. A spe for a trigger strategy sðs; l0Þ with cut-off level l0 can only
exist, when the corresponding trigger strategy with infinite sanction time,
sð1; l0Þ, constitutes a spe. For this strategy to be an spe sð1; l0Þ it is
necessary that
T^w  tqRT^w þ R^ðtqT  1Þ
tqR  1  0; ð9Þ
Proof: see appendix.
The proof in the appendix shows how condition (9) follows if s¼ 1 is used
to find the corresponding individual rationality constraint for cut-off level l.
This is the constraint that under the trigger regime (s,l), individuals’
expected payoff from continued work contribution is always lower or equal
to the payoff they could obtain with their best possible unilateral deviation
in the work game. The symbol R^ in (9) refers to the expected payoff from
one round of universal cooperation, which is R^ww ¼ ð1 eÞa c for task
cooperation and R^wa ¼ ð1 eÞa cþ ðN  1Þðb c0Þ for full cooperation.
The symbol T^w indicates the expected payoff from one round of unilateral
shirking, T^ww ¼ ð1 eÞ aðN1ÞN for task cooperation and T^w;wa ¼ ð1 eÞ
7Due to symmetry, trigger strategies always constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium, if
they satisfy the conditions for Nash-equilibrium. The proof is given by Friedman (1986).
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aðN1Þ
N
þ ðN  1Þðb c0Þ under full cooperation. Finally, the symbols qR and
qT in (9) refer to the probability that no sanction phase is triggered in a
normal period after universal work and after unilateral shirking in the work
game, respectively. These probabilities are obtained from the binomial
distribution as qRð1 e; l;NÞ and qT ð1 e; l;N  1Þ, the probabilities that
at least l actors will produce output when all N members contribute with
success rate of (1e), and when N1 members work and the focal actor
deviates unilaterally, respectively.
The second operation of the numerical procedure is to calculate and
compare the optimal expected payoffs from universal cooperation that can
be obtained for those cut-off levels l0 that satisfy condition (9). The optimal
profiles sðs; l0Þ can be found by inspection of only one trigger strategy per
cut-off level l. This is the strategy with the most lenient sanction time s that
is just restrictive enough to deter deviations under a cut-off level l0.
Intuitively, the reason is that as long as sanctions are severe enough to
guarantee individual rationality, it is in the best interest of every group
member to reduce as much as possible the expected amount of punishment
over the course of the game. Technically, Theorem 2 asserts that efficiency
is always maximized when s is minimized, subject to the constraint of
individual rationality and given a constant cut-off level l.
Theorem 2. If for a given cut-off level l0 the trigger strategy sð1; l0Þ is in
equilibrium for infinite sanction time s, then the payoff dominant spe for the
cut-off level l0 is the one with the smallest sanction time s ¼ s
ðl0Þ of all spe’s











where Ceil(x) yields the smallest integer larger than or equal to x. Proof: see
appendix.
The proof in the appendix shows how condition (10) derives from the
effect of the sanction time s on the expected payoffs from optimal uni-
lateral work defection, ui, and unilateral cooperation ui. Shorter sanction
time s does not affect the probabilities that sanctions are triggered in a
normal period, but it reduces the expected duration of sanction periods
over the entire game. This increases expected payoffs from both coop-
eration and unilateral defection. However, payoffs from unilateral defection
benefit more, because shorter s also implies more frequent sanction peri-
ods, and in every sanction period shirkers gain initially from unilateral
defection. Hence, there is a critical lowest sanction time s
, below which
the individual rationality constraint ui  ui can no longer be satisfied.
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To summarize, using Theorems 1 and 2 and a given vector of parameters
ða; b; c; c0;N ; e; tÞ, the algorithm finds the optimal spes for task cooperation
and full cooperation and tests whether relational cooperation, saa, likewise
constitutes a spe for the given parameter vector (Condition 6). For full
cooperation, the algorithm tests in addition the condition for deterrence of
full defection, as seen in condition (8). Then, the expected payoffs of the
optimal equilibria of each type of strategy are compared, and the best one
is selected. If none of the trigger strategies is sustained by a spe, the
solution for ða; b; c; c0;N ; e; tÞ is full and eternal defection, with zero group
performance and zero group cohension.
Aggregate Outcomes: Expected Performance and
Expected Cohesion
To obtain comparative statics, expected performance and expected cohe-
sion are measured on basis of the relative size of the range of discount
levels, t, that sustain the corresponding solutions. More precisely, the
algorithm varies t for a given set of conditions ða; b; c; c0;N ; eÞ between
t ¼ 0 and t ¼ 1 in steps of 0.01. For every level of t, the corresponding
solution of the game is identified and the ensuing expected performance
pðtÞ and expected group cohesion p0ðtÞ is measured. Overall expected
performance and cohesion at ða; b; c; c0;N ; eÞ are then computed as
averages across the range of t.
Expected performance is zero and expected group cohesion is one, if the
solution of the game is relational cooperation for a particular level of t.
Expected group cohesion is zero when the solution is a task cooperation
strategy. When the solution of the game is full cooperation or task coop-
eration, the expected group performance is obtained as the probability that
a particular round of the game falls within a normal period, multiplied with
the expected group output ð1 eÞ in a normal iteration. Technically,
p ¼ ð1 eÞd^R
d^R þ s
; ð11Þ
where d^R refers to the expected duration of a normal period,
d^R ¼ 1=ð1 qRÞ. The probability to be in a normal period is obtained from
the expected duration of a normal period relative to expected total length
of normal period plus subsequent sanction period, d^R þ s. Expected
cohesion, p0, under full cooperation is obtained similarly. Expected cohe-
sion in an iteration of a normal period is always one, whereas it is always
zero in a sanction period. Accordingly, the average level of cohesion across
the entire game equals the relative number of iterations that take place in a
normal period, p0 ¼ d^R=ðd^R þ sÞ.
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RESULTS
The traditional theory of compliant peer pressure suggests that higher
dependence on peer approval from the group increases both cohesion and
performance. In this view, effective informal control is the link between
strong ties and performance. The weakness of strong ties, by contrast,
implies that at least in certain regions of the parameter space dependence
may boost cohesion but fail to foster or even reduce performance. In the
following, I analyze this effect of actors’ dependence, b.
The analysis departs from the baseline condition of task certainty
(e ¼ 0), where social control effectively helps to solve free rider problems.
In the following three sections, I present analytical results for the baseline
scenario, numerical analysis to show how increasing task uncertainty
erodes the effectiveness of social control, and demonstrate that depen-
dence on peer approval may even undermine group performance in a highly
severe social dilemma.
How Peer Pressure is Effective: Task Uncertainty
For the baseline condition of task certainty (e ¼ 0), results for the behavior
of rational workers have been derived analytically (Flache, 1996; Flache
et al., 2000). Increasing dependence on peer approval improves both
cohesion and group performance in a large region of the parameter space.
Moreover, the analysis showed that, contrary to the hypothesized failure of
informal control, higher dependence never reduces performance. Theorem
3 formulates the corresponding proposition.
Theorem 3. Effects of dependence on peer approval, b, under task certainty
(e ¼ 0Þ
In the repeated team game, increasing dependence on peer approval, b,
always fosters expected cohesion. Moreover, when b exceeds a threshold
level given by (15), dependence on peer approval also fosters performance.
Below the threshold level, b has no effect on performance. More technically:
@p
@b
















Proof: see Flache (1996, cf. Flache, Macy, Raub 2000).
Theorem 3 follows from Friedman’s (1971, 1986) result for the individual
rationality of trigger strategies under perfect information. Under perfect
information, full cooperation simply adds the costs and benefits of the
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separate exchanges of work for work and approval for approval. This implies
the turning point in the effect of dependence identified by Theorem 3. Beyond
the turning point, peer approval is so valuable that conditions for individual
rationality of relational cooperation are less restrictive than are conditions for
task cooperation. Then, conditions for the combination of the two exchanges
are likewise less restrictive than for task cooperation alone. As a con-
sequence, performance in this region of the parameter space is solely based
on full cooperation, causing the simultaneous increase of cohesion and per-
formance as actors’ dependence rises. Conversely, below the turning point,
approval has so little value to group members that performance is pre-
dominantly based on task cooperation. Here, peer pressure is not needed to
sustain performance, and higher dependence has no effect on group output.
How Task Uncertainty Erodes Peer Pressure
To demonstrate effects of task uncertainty, I consider a scenario in which
workers face a serious free-rider problem in the work game. With N¼ 10,
a¼ 1 and c¼ 0.5, the marginal costs of a unit of effort are five times as large as
the corresponding marginal benefit. Following Coleman (1990, 277) I assume
that the costs of generating a unit of approval are small relative to potential
control benefits, i.e., c0 ¼ 0.05, only one-tenth of the costs of contribution to
the work task. Dependence on peer approval b varies in 100 equidistant steps
between no dependence, b ¼ 0; and a very high level of dependence, b ¼ 0:5;
where approval by one group member is sufficient to compensate costs of
task contribution. Figure 1 shows the result. For comparison, task certainty
(e ¼ 0:0Þ is analyzed together with moderate task uncertainty (e ¼ 0:1Þ and
strong task uncertainty (e ¼ 0:2Þ. The results are calculated with the
numerical procedure described in the Model Analysis section of this article.
Figure 1 demonstrates how increasing task uncertainty gradually erodes
the effectiveness of informal control. Under task certainty, ðe ¼ 0:0Þ,
informal control is sufficiently strong to push group performance from a
level of about p¼ 0.5 in groups with low interest in peer approval, up to a
level of about p¼ 0.8 in groups whose members strongly depend on peer
approval. However, in groups facing high task uncertainty (e ¼ 0:2Þ,
expected performance remains dramatically low, with less than p¼ 0.25
even in groups where peer approval is deemed highly valuable (b ¼ 0:5Þ. As
predicted by the weakness of strong ties, the gradual decline in perfor-
mance is not matched with a corresponding decline in cohesion. As interest
in peer approval rises, cohesion soars, regardless of the level of task
uncertainty. At all levels of e, even moderate interest in peer approval
(b ¼ 0:1Þ suffices to boost cohesion up to about p¼ 0.5 from the initial
level of zero cohesion with no interest in peer approval, and with b ¼ 0:5
cohesion approaches its maximum level.
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Inspection of the right part of Figure 1 reveals why task uncertainty
undermines peer pressure despite the emergence of strong ties. As task
uncertainty rises, the conditions become increasingly restrictive, under
FIGURE 1 Effects of dependence on peer approval (b) on aggregate outcomes
(left) and distribution of solutions in the b-t parameter space (right) for three dif-
ferent levels of task uncertainty, e. N¼ 10, a¼ 1, c¼ 0.5, c0 ¼ 0.05. White regions in
right part of the figure indicate full defection.
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which full cooperation obtains at a particular level of b. With task uncertainty,
the problem for full cooperation is that efficiency losses from mutual
sanctions caused by work failure spill over into social relations. This may put a
considerable pressure on social relations, compromising the efficiency of full
cooperation relative to the efficiency of relational cooperation. Even when
the group obtains full cooperation under moderate task uncertainty
(e ¼ 0:1Þ, mutual sanctions may drive the level of performance sustained
down to not more than p¼ 0.22, a level that occurs, when actors are only
moderately interested in peer approval but are sufficiently interested in
future payoffs to render full cooperation attractive (b ¼ 0:11; t ¼ 0:7Þ: Due
to the spill-over effect, cohesion likewise reduces to not more than p0 ¼ 0.39
at this point in the parameter space. Clearly, with this strong pressure on
social ties, full cooperation is only barely payoff superior to relational coop-
eration, where performance is zero but cohesion is at its maximum of p0 ¼ 1.
Accordingly, relational cooperation increasingly dominates full cooperation,
as task uncertainty rises. The right part of Figure 1 shows how with strong
task uncertainty this occurs under a large range of conditions even when the
competing regime of full cooperation is also individually rational. With task
certainty, full cooperation would then prevail. Under task uncertainty, rela-
tional cooperation predominates. As a consequence, strong ties form without
effective peer pressure in these groups. While expected performance is as
low as about p¼ 0.25 in highly dependent teams under strong uncertainty,
expected cohesion attains almost its maximum level here.
Task Uncertainty Reverts Effects of Dependents in a Severe
Dilemma
The result of Figure 1 clearly questions Homans’ theory of compliant peer
pressure in cohesive groups. At the same time, model effects fall short of
the ‘‘weakness of strong ties’’ that Flache and Macy (1996) demonstrated
for groups of adaptive agents. In simulations that used an almost identical
baseline scenario as in Figure 2, they showed that higher dependence on
peer approval not only failed to foster performance but also could actually
reduce performance at the expense of cohesion8. The spill-over effect from
ties to task revealed by Figure 1 suggests that this may become a possibility
for rational actors facing task uncertainty, when the cost:benefit ratio for
work contributions further deteriorates.
8The original simulations (Flache and Macy, 1996, pp. 19) assumed task certainty (" ¼ 0Þ
and lower costs of approval, with c0 ¼ 0.01. The assumption of higher costs of approval is
inessential for the qualitative result of the present analysis. Robustness tests revealed the
same qualitative effects with c0 ¼ 0.01.
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To demonstrate this possibility, I adapted the baseline scenario such that
shirking becomes highly attractive due to excessive costs of compliance
(c¼ 0.85). With this cost level, high performance is hard to sustain but still
collectively efficient, i.e., (a> c). At the same time, full cooperation
requires a highly restrictive sanction regime in order to secure perfor-
mance. It can be expected that the spill-over of efficiency losses from task
to ties dramatically curtails the attractiveness of full cooperation as com-
pared with relational cooperation, as soon as actors gain interest in peer
approval. To demonstrate the problem, I replicated the preceding analysis
with c¼ 0.85 and a very low level of task uncertainty (e ¼ 0:01Þ. All other
conditions remained unchanged. Figure 2 shows the results.
Figure 2 reveals how in a severe social dilemma even marginal task
uncertainty reverts the effect of dependence. Consistent with Homan’s
theory, higher dependence on peer approval increases task performance,
but only below a level of b ¼ 0:2: Beyond this turning point, further
dependence on peer approval undermines performance rather than sus-
tains it. The right part of Figure 2 shows why this happens. Higher
dependence always widens the range of conditions under which full
FIGURE 2 Effects of dependence on peer approval (b) on aggregate outcomes
(left) and distribution of solutions in the b-t parameter space (right) for severe
social dilemma (a ¼ 1; c ¼ 0:85Þ, and moderate task uncertainty, e ¼ 0:01. N ¼ 10,
a ¼ 1, c0 ¼ 0:05: White regions in right part of the figure indicate full defection.
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cooperation is individually rational. However, at the same time, relational
cooperation increasingly dominates full cooperation as b increases. The net
effect is that eventually the area begins to shrink in which full cooperation
is attained by the group.
Closer inspection shows that two opposing effects of actors’ interest in
future payoffs, t, cause the increasing dominance of relational cooperation.
These effects of t are best explained when a fixed level of b is considered.
With b ¼ 0:4; full cooperation dominates relational cooperation in groups
facing a long shadow of the future (t > 0:72) and in groups with low
interest in future payoffs (t < 0:41Þ: The first effect of t determines the
lower bound of this region. At t ¼ 0:21; full cooperation becomes sus-
tainable, but at this low level of t strong deterrence of deviations is
required. In this range, only the full cooperation strategy is sustainable that
imposes the most restrictive cut-off level of l¼ 10, combined with the
optimal sanction time s¼ 1. With swað1; 10Þ, higher interest in future
payoffs improves the utility of relational cooperation more than the utility
of full cooperation. The reason is that relational cooperation yields con-
tinuous rewards, while the payoff stream of full cooperation is disrupted by
sanction phases with zero payoff. Accordingly, full cooperation is more
attractive for players with low interest in future payoffs t, who are mainly
interested in the early phase of the game, before the first sanction phase is
entered. As soon as t exceeds a level of 0.41, relational cooperation
therefore becomes superior to the full cooperation of swað1; 10Þ.
The second effect of t works in the opposite direction. Sanctions needed
to sustain full cooperation become less restrictive with higher interest in
the future. At b ¼ 0:4, the cut-off level l drops from l¼ 110 to l¼ 79, as
soon as interest in the future exceeds t ¼ 0:72. Correspondingly, efficiency
losses rapidly decline and beyond t ¼ 0:72, full cooperation payoff dom-
inates mere relational cooperation. The net effect of b on performance
results from how dependence shapes the upper and the lower bound of the
region in which relational cooperation prevails. As dependence increases,
both thresholds decline, but the effect of b is stronger on the lower bound
than on the upper bound. Hence, peer pressure increasingly loses ground
to relational cooperation and performance declines.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Recent research (Flache, 1996; Flache and Macy, 1996) suggests a ‘‘weak-
ness of strong ties.’’ Contrary with the prevalent view of the literature, this
research argues that strong social ties may undermine group solidarity in a
social dilemma rather than to foster a solution on basis of informal control.
In a nutshell, the argument focuses on the desire of actors to obtain social
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rewards, such as affection or approval, from other group members. Pre-
vious work overlooked that this desire may often compromise actors’
willingness to impose social control. Accordingly, so the argument goes,
informal control may flow into the maintenance of strong ties at the
expense of the common good.
This article strengthened and generalized the argument. While the ori-
ginal analysis derived the failure of informal control only for ‘‘backward-
looking’’ actors with extremely low cognitive capacity, this article assumes
perfect rationality. In the original study, informal control was predicted to
fail because for backward-looking actors the lower coordination complexity
of bilateral exchanges favors cooperation in interpersonal ties relative to
more complex groupwise cooperation. This study revealed an alternative
mechanism that causes social control to fail. Imperfect information in terms
of task uncertainty can generate the result even when group members are
modelled as strategically rational decision makers.
Particularly in work organizations, task uncertainty may often put
informal control under pressure. Task uncertainty may cause sequences of
mutual sanctions that increase costs of control and, accordingly, reduce the
attractiveness of investment in peer pressure. The game theoretical ana-
lysis of this article confirmed that larger task uncertainty may increase the
gap between common good production and group cohesion. In groups
facing an extremely severe social dilemma, higher dependence on peer
rewards makes groups more cohesive but less productive, consistent with
the hypothesized weakness of strong ties. In a more moderate social
dilemma, task uncertainty does not revert the effect of dependence, but it
can still render social control virtually ineffective. Moreover, the game
theoretical model showed that failure of informal control may be the
optimal solution for rational agents. This leads beyond Flache and Macy’s
(1996) simulations of adaptive agents, where actors stumbled into the
suboptimal outcome of collective action failure that rational agents can
avoid under the same conditions (Flache, 1996; Flache, Macy, Raub, 2000).
While these results open an intriguing new possibility for theories of
social control, the study rests on a number of simplifications that need
careful consideration in future work. Previous group research points to four
complications to be inspected. Production norms in work groups may not be
directed at output maximization, group dynamics may alternate between
phases of cohesion and phases of compliance, groups are not homogeneous
in formal and informal status, and, finally, social ties consist not only of
reward exchange. These complications do not necessarily limit the con-
clusions, but they may open up promising directions for future research.
The model assumes that output maximization constitutes a common
interest of group members. However, Homans’ (1951) case of the bank
wiring room documents that production norms may evolve that demand
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from members an intermediate rather than maximal level of effort.
Petersen (1992) indicates two plausible model extensions that address
the intermediate effort norms in future research. Petersen’s analysis
assumes that workers’ effort is continuous rather than discrete, and the
marginal benefit of group output declines in effort. With this, the most
efficient production norm imposes an intermediate effort level that
maximizes net utility rather than total effort. At the same time, this does
not change the basic logic of the weakness of strong ties. Even with
intermediate effort levels, workers face incentives to shirk and social
pressures are both needed to sustain compliance and suffer from task
uncertainties.
Group research also revealed a dynamic form of intermediate output
norms not captured with the present model. A group may develop an
emergent cycle in which time periods with priority for work alternate with
time periods dominated by social activity, another pattern described in
Homans’ (1951) case of the bank wiring group. Future modelling may
explore how this pattern can be explained within the repeated team game
framework. It seems plausible that individuals’ experienced effort costs are
not constant but increase gradually in periods of ongoing work and decline
again in periods of rest. With this, individual rationality may sustain effi-
cient norms that coordinate group7wise switches from task cooperation to
relational cooperation and back at the moments when subjective effort
costs exceed or fall below critical levels. However, while this elaboration
promises to greatly enrich the behavioral patterns generated by the ana-
lysis, it retains the mechanism that causes the potential weakness of social
control. Particularly towards the end of work phases, when fatigue rises,
peer pressure may be needed to deter untimely shirking. Again, deviants
may then utilize others’ dependence on peer rewards to insulate them-
selves from these social pressures.
The present study precludes informal status differentiation, a phe-
nomenon well known from group research (Homans, 1951). Both the
effects and the emergence of informal status hierarchies are consistent
with the repeated game model if the present assumptions of group
homogeneity and discrete approval levels are relaxed. Bendor and Moo-
kherjee (1987) showed how heterogeneity in individual effort costs may
give rise to individually rational production norms that divide the group
into workers and shirkers. Future work may explore how approval
exchanges could explain the emergence of informal status hierarchies in a
divided group. Workers become high status members when social control
strategies direct approval to workers and withhold it from shirkers. How-
ever, with continuous approval levels, new forms of a rational weakness of
strong ties may arise in status hierarchies. In particular, it may become
individually rational for isolated shirkers to exploit workers’ dependence
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on peer rewards and to offer them exchange of approval for approval at an
asymmetrical rate of return. The strategy compensates workers for their
efforts and simultaneously alleviates the isolation otherwise imposed on
shirkers.
Formal hierarchical status differences are a further mechanism that may
preclude collective action failure, for instance when a supervisor in a work
team sanctions shirkers and rewards contributors. The present analysis
does not take formal hierarchy into account. However, it allows to identify
new conditions for the effectiveness of formal control mechanisms. The
more susceptible a group is to the weakness of strong ties when hier-
archical control is absent, the more costly or the less effective formal
control may be. Similarly, the hypothesis of a weakness of strong ties may
help to understand certain features of formal control mechanisms. Orga-
nizations may be particularly inclined to suppress strong bilateral ties or to
encourage compliant control if the situation of a group is conducive for the
failure of informal peer pressure.
Finally, the predicted conflict between social relations and collective
exchanges may occur not only in ties that consist of exchanges of peer
rewards, but also when network relations channel communications. For
example, in research teams, a ‘‘communication dilemma’’ (Bonacich,
1992) arises when status gains or bonus payments reward exceptional
individual performance. The team as a whole may benefit when all
members share their knowledge with the group. At the same time, indi-
viduals face incentives to collude in dyadic exchanges of information or in
small cliques. Whether members trade knowledge multilaterally or bilat-
erally, the exchanges require cooperation among participants. However,
team performance may suffer because cooperation in collusive bilateral
exchanges may be more easily attained due to better monitoring and less
uncertainty. As a consequence, members may be distracted from the
collectively superior solution of sharing knowledge with the group as a
whole, precluding multilateral exchanges even when the latter are more
efficient.
To conclude, this article adds to the theoretical evidence that informal
control as a solution for social dilemmas may be overrated. Clearly, the
analysis is preliminary and rests on a number of simplifying assumptions. At
the same time, it considerably generalizes the argument beyond the pre-
vious learning theoretical underpinning of the possibility of a weakness of
strong ties. This is of interest both for organizations facing social dilemmas
and for researchers studying the dilemmas. Organizations may be well
advised not to rely too easily on the traditional view that strong ties
facilitate group solidarity. Researchers might feel encouraged to test this
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
The expected payoff for the remainder of the game after universal coop-
eration in a normal period in round t is obtained by
ui ¼ R^þ tqRui þ tsþ1ð1 qRÞui; ðA1Þ
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where R^ refers to the expected payoff in round t, and qR to the probability
of continuation of the normal period. Rearranging of (A1) yields the
explicit form
ui ¼ R^
1 tqR  tsþ1ð1 qRÞ : ðA2Þ
The expected payoff ui for the remainder of the game that ensues after
unilateral shirking for one round t in a normal period, followed by
immediate return to the cooperative strategy, is
ui ¼ T^w þ tqT ui þ tsþ1ð1 qT Þui; ðA3Þ
where ui is to be substituted according to (A1) andT^w and qT refer to the
expected one-shot payoff of unilateral defection and the probability for
subsequent continuation of the normal period. According to Bellman’s
(1957) optimality principle for dynamic programming under exponential
discounting, a strategy cannot be improved by any change in a repeated
game if it is impossible to improve the strategy in one step (cf. Kreps, 1990,
p. 798). Hence, the trigger strategy sðs; lÞ constitutes a spe if ui  ui,
because then it can not be improved by any unilateral deviation.
The above yields the limit for s !1 of ui  ui:
lim
s!1ui  ui ¼
T^w  tqRT^w þ R^ðtqT  1Þ
tqR  1 ; ðA4Þ
This proves that condition (9) is necessary for trigger strategies with
infinite sanction time, sð1; lÞ, to be in equilbrium. To proof that for a
particular cut-off level l, the corresponding trigger strategy can only be in
equilibrium when (9) is satisfied, the difference ui  ui is calculated in
(A5) for finite s.
ui  ui ¼ R^ T^w  qT R^tþ qRT^tþ ððqT  1ÞR^þ ð1 qRÞT^Þt
sþ1
1 qRtþ ðqR  1Þtsþ1 : ðA5Þ
Accordingly, the partial derivative of ui  ui by the sanction time s is
@ðui  uiÞ
@s
¼ ðqR  qT ÞR^ðt 1Þt
sþ1 ln t
ð1 qRtþ ðqR  1Þtsþ1Þ2
ðA6Þ
The r.h.s. expression in (A6) always yields a positive result. The numerator
is positive, as it is a square. The denominator is positive, because
qR  qT > 0, and by definition universal cooperation is payoff superior to
universal defection (Prisoner’s dilemma), hence R^ > 0. Finally, both
(t 1) and ln t are negative, and tsþ1 is positive, as 0< t< 1. This implies
that the difference ui  ui, always increases in the sanction time s. Hence,
ui  ui can never be positive, if it is not positive for s ¼ 1. Q.E.D.
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ð1 qRtþ ðqR  1Þtsþ1Þ2
ðA7Þ
The proof of Theorem 1 implies that under positive task7uncertainty
ð0 < e < 1 , 0 < qR < 1Þ, the derivative given by (A7) is always nega-
tive. Hence, the best individually rational trigger strategy for a fixed cut-off
level l is the one with the smallest sanction time that still satisfies the
condition for individual rationality. To find the corresponding sanction time,
solve the equation ui ¼ ui as given by (A2) and (A3) for s. This yields the
(non-integer) sanction time s
 at which payoffs from the one step deviation
balance payoffs from cooperation. Hence, the optimal sustainable sanction
time for a given cut-off level is the smallest integer larger than s
, which
yields the term given by (10). Q.E.D.
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